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Abstract— Based on the assumption that cloud providers can 
be trusted (to a certain extent) we define a trust, security and 
privacy preserving infrastructure that relies on trusted cloud 
providers to operate properly. Working in tandem with legal 
agreements, our open source software supports: trust and 
reputation management, sticky policies with fine grained 
access controls, privacy preserving delegation of authority, 
federated identity management, different levels of assurance 
and configurable audit trails. Armed with these tools, cloud 
service providers are then able to offer a reliable privacy 
preserving infrastructure-as-a-service to their clients. 
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I.  OVERVIEW 
For the last three years the EC TAS3 integrated project 
(www.tas3.eu) has been building a trust, privacy and security 
(TPS) infrastructure for web services. The project assumes 
that service providers would like to offer trustworthy 
services to their customers if the cost of doing so is not 
prohibitive, i.e. if tools and mechanisms are readily available 
to help them. TAS3’s objective is to provide these at a 
minimum cost through a series of open source tools, 
procedures and services. The resulting TPS infrastructure is 
provided as a set of web services, so that cloud IaaS, PaaS 
and SaaS providers can build their own services upon these 
(see Figure 1). A cloud IaaS provider will provide machines 
to users containing the interfaces to the authorization service, 
audit service, trust negotiation service etc. so that users can 
build their own TPS applications or platforms. A cloud PaaS 
provider will add its own platform tools in addition to the 
TPS ones, whilst a cloud SaaS provider will provide fully 
operational TPS enabled applications to its users. 
Each TPS infrastructure requires a trusted third party, the 
Trust Network Operator (TNO) to oversee its operation and 
ensure that all the required services are operational. In order 
to offer a TPS-enhanced service, a cloud service provider 
(CSP) must “join the TN” by asking the TNO to perform a 
series of validation tests to confirm that its TPS service is 
running correctly. The CSP then signs a contract with the 
TNO to say that it will honor users’ privacy policies and 
provide the TN’s audit service with an audit summary of all 
accesses to its users’ personal information. It further agrees 
that in cases of disputes with its users, the TN auditor may 
inspect its detailed audit trails to determine the sequence of 
disputed events and make a judgment. The CSP then joins 
the trust network, its services are entered in the TN’s 
directory of services, and it publishes its terms and 




















































Figure 1.  Components of the Cloud Trust, Security and Privacy 
Infrastructure 
Contracts play the expected role of binding together users 
and CSPs to a set of terms and conditions, but also provide 
the needed binding to minimum policies, practices and 
technical requirements needed to operate a TPS.  At the 
highest level, the high level policies and obligations are set 
forth in a Trust Network Agreement.  The binding to polices, 
practices and technical requirements is supported by an 
intake process where the capacity of prospective CSPs to 
meet the requirements is evaluated.  These concepts and 
governance structure are built with the objective of 
enhancing trust across a complex ecosystem of service 
providers that may not be in direct contact or even known to 
an individual using a particular CSP.  It is not possible for 
individuals to control or comprehend the myriad options and 
delivery mechanisms of CSPs.  This may not be the case 
where an individual has a defined service provided by a 
known provider, but cloud services are progressively 
including multiple service providers and multiple services 
creating a need to enable trust across the cloud ecosystem. A 
TAS3 type governance architecture that establishes 
minimum requirements of privacy and security, which all 
providers use as a baseline, combined with giving users both 
a complaint and remediation process, which enables them to 
exercise their rights, enhances both the likely compliance of 
the actors and the transparency and accountability that 
enables greater user trust. 
Prospective users may search the TN’s service directory 
to find candidate CSPs offering the services they require.  
The user’s web services client (WSC) may then enter into a 
trust negotiation session with each of the CSPs to determine 
the most suitable one to use, without actually invoking a 
given CSP service. The purpose of trust negotiation is: to 
determine whether or not it and the CSP possess the required 
attributes (authorization credentials) in order for the WSC to 
access the service (i.e. to enable the WSC and the CSP to 
establish mutual trust); and in cases where both the WSC and 
the CSP do possess the required attributes/credentials, which 
subset of them, disclosed by the WSC to the CSP, is 
sufficient to grant access to the resource. We have developed 
a special form of credential disclosure policy which we call 
‘CUP’ (for “COSIC UniPro”), and extended the 
TrustBuilder2 (TB2) framework. CUP policies are based on 
the UniPro approach of automated trust negotiation. UniPro 
allows CSPs (and WSCs) to partially disclose access control 
policies, so as to facilitate progress in the negotiation 
protocol. This is an improvement compared to traditional 
approaches where policies are either disclosed in their 
entirety or not at all. 
After choosing the most suitable/trustworthy/cost 
effective CSP, the user enters into a contractual agreement 
with the chosen CSP, and prepares to submit their personal 
and/or sensitive data to the cloud service. Users are entitled 
to set their own sticky privacy policies when they submit 
their data to the cloud service, and the CSP will ensure that 
this policy remains with this data during its lifetime. 
Furthermore the CSP will, at the user’s request, ensure that a 
summary audit trail of accesses to this data is forwarded to 
the user as well as to the TN’s audit service.  
In due course the user may choose to transfer his data and 
its sticky policy to another CSP. Alternatively, the business 
process that is utilizing the user’s data may have a similar 
requirement. In either case the sticky policy remains with the 
data and the new CSP similarly commits to enforcing this 
policy and providing the TN with an audit summary of all 
accesses. The user may rate the trustworthiness of its CSP 
using the TN’s trust and reputation service (TRS).   
The TRS is built with configurable metrics based on user 
and system feedback, third party recommendations and key 
performance indicators. This can easily be extended with 
new sources of information and calculation methods. To be 
able to customize a reputation score according to a user’s 
needs a flexible language is used to express how to compute 
reputations from feedback. The language can express 
anything from a simple average of one facet to complex 
centrality metrics where reputation based weights are 
assigned to feedback items. System events and the audit 
summary also provide a form of feedback. Results from 
automated CSP testing are also available to build reputation 
metrics. CSPs as well as third parties can recommend a CSP 
for a given purpose by issuing it with a recommendation. 
Users decide who is an authority for this, i.e. whose 
recommendations they trust. Key performance indicators are 
a fourth type of feedback. Financial (e.g. profit, stock price) 
and non-financial (e.g. delivery time, patents filed) indicators 
are normalized to form dynamic reputation metrics. This 
allows the business performance of a CSP to be taken into 
account in determining its reputation. 
TAS3 provides a federated identity management (FIM) 
infrastructure to ensure mutual authentication of WSCs and 
CSPs, based on the Liberty Alliance specifications, which 
are themselves based on SAMLv2. We have enhanced the 
Liberty Alliance scheme in a number of ways. Firstly we 
have introduced the Level of Assurance (LoA) concept based 
on the NIST scheme. This tells the CSP how strongly the 
user has been authenticated which allows the CSP to better 
control access to its resources by ensuring that the user has 
been authenticated strongly enough for the requested mode 
of access. We have introduced attribute aggregation into the 
FIM infrastructure, through the introduction of a Trusted 
Attribute Aggregation Service which links user’s IdP 
accounts together. This allows the user to merge attributes 
from different IdPs into a single session with a CSP, 
Delegation is often a requirement in cloud computing. 
We have implemented a delegation service (DS) that allows 
users to delegate access rights to their cloud resources to 
anyone (or any process) of their choosing. In our design, 
either an IdP or a CSP can run a DS which allows its users to 
delegate an authorisation attribute to other users, as directed 
by its delegation policy. We have enhanced conventional 
delegation, in which the DS knows the identity of both the 
delegator and the delegate, to work in a federated 
environment where the identity of the delegate is initially 
unknown to the DS. This “privacy protecting delegation 
mechanism” is based on invitations in which the delegator 
asks the DS for permission to delegate her attribute to 
someone, and the DS issues the delegator with an 
unforgeable delegation invitation token which she must give 
to her chosen delegate. The delegate presents the token to the 
DS and is asked to authenticate via one of the TN’s IdPs, 
after which the DS issues him a delegation credential valid 
for the period specified by the delegator. The delegate can 
now repeatedly use this delegated attribute, granting him the 
delegated access rights, until it is either revoked or expires. 
The secure publish-subscribe infrastructure allows the 
distribution of summary audit messages and sticky policy 
updates throughout the TN. Every CSP that receives a sticky 
policy must subscribe for updates and must publish summary 
audits. The user’s dashboard, which records the user’s 
interactions with the TN, contains an audit service to receive 
the summary audits, and a sticky policy update service to 
publish changes to the user’s sticky policy. 
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